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DEPT ALSO FOR ISN, PM/WRA, EUR/UMB, EUR/PRA

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TAGS: [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [MNUC](#) [ETTC](#) [PHSA](#) [PINR](#) [CA](#) [UK](#) [PL](#) [UP](#)
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: BILATERAL NONPROLIFERATION WORKING GROUP
(NPWG) DATES AND AGENDA

REF: A. STATE 4758 (NOTAL)

[1](#)B. 06 STATE 193028
[1](#)C. 06 STATE 190802
[1](#)D. 06 STATE 189715

Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission Kent Logsdon for reasons
1.4(b,c,d)

[1](#)1. (U) This is an action request. See para 8.

2 (S) Summary: We delivered draft agenda contained ref A to MFA Director Belashov January 17. His specific comments on the agenda contained below in para 4. Belashov also complained that USG suspicions about possible transfer cases were often baseless; requested that the requests be vetted more carefully, since the Ukrainian follow-up investigations were costly; and inquired whether requests for such information could be passed through intelligence channels. End summary.

[1](#)3. (U) Visiting EUR/PRA Director Anita Friedt, PM/WRA Deputy Director Steve Costner, Defense Threat Reduction Office (DTRO) Kyiv Chief Luke Kluchko, and poloff delivered draft nonproliferation working group (NPWG) agenda January 17 to MFA Military Technical Cooperation and Arms Control Department Director Volodymyr Belashov. Counselor Oleh Belokolos and Olena Syrota from his department also sat in.

Agenda Comments

[1](#)4. (S) Belashov had the following specific comments regarding the agenda:

-- He suggested combining agenda item 4 (nuclear energy issues) with item 5 (HEU removal from Kyiv and Sevastopol); item 1 (Global Partnership) with item 6 (construction of spent nuclear fuel storage facility); and item 11 with item 12, thereby combining all categories of transfer cases. Belashov added that the Ukrainian delegation would be prepared to report on implementation status of the 18 projects under the Global Partnership nuclear smuggling initiative. (Comment: Belashov appeared dismayed at the number of separate agenda items (17), which had ballooned from around 12 in earlier meetings, and to be seeking to streamline the discussion somewhat by reducing the number.)

-- Belashov requested clarification on what would be discussed under each agenda item, in particular item 2 (nuclear smuggling) and item 3, (nonproliferation of WMD expertise/Science and Technology Center). He said Security

Service of Ukraine (SBU) representatives would be prepared to discuss recent cases involving attempted sales domestically of radioactive and sensitive materials, but sought guidance on whether item 2 called for such information. He also asked for an advance confirmation of the transfer cases that the Ukrainian side should be prepared to discuss. (Comment: In general, Belashov appeared to be seeking information in order to better determine the composition of the Ukrainian delegation, such as, for example, whether to include someone knowledgeable on Science and Technology Center activities.)

-- Belashov said the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense had asked that "melange rocket fuel" be added as an agenda item, possibly with Polish participation. Belashov added parenthetically that the containers holding 16,000 tons altogether of the highly toxic and corrosive material were expected to begin leaking in two years, so not much time remained to address the problem. The OSCE was willing to help, but OSCE procedures required a lengthy lead time to start a project. Ukraine was also asking the EU for assistance, and Poland had agreed to provide \$300,000-\$400,000 to convert melange into fertilizer or an industrial chemical.

-- Belashov had no objection to participation of UK, Polish, and Canadian government officials. He suggested that Germany, since it is simultaneously G8 and EU presidents, also be invited to sit in on relevant agenda items. (We would suggest including the Polish and UK representatives in the discussion on melange, if the Department agrees to add it to the agenda.)

15. (U) Friedt welcomed Belashov's suggestion that a representative of state-owned enterprise Ukrspetsexport be included as part of the Ukrainian delegation. Belashov said the Ukrspetsexport representative would be Deputy Director

General Lysenko.

Transfer Cases

16. (S) Belashov apologized for the delay in responding to our requests for information on possible transfers of MTCR-prohibited or dual-use technologies (refs B-D). He said MFA was merely the conduit for Ukrainian government responses. His office immediately contacted other offices for information with a request to expedite a response, but the information could take as long as a month-and-a-half to come in. MFA was obligated to pass on USG inquiries to all responsible offices, resulting in a large expenditure of manpower and resources to track down the information. While the Pavlograd mixer case was a notable exception, Belashov complained that many USG inquiries turned out to be baseless and wondered whether the request for information could be passed in intelligence channels rather than through the MFA. (Embassy Note: We routinely coordinate the delivery of our requests for information on these possible transfer cases with other relevant USG agencies at post, and try to deliver these requests to the MFA and the Ukrainian security services in parallel. We find that double-tracking these requests for information works well. End Note)

17. (S) In many cases, Belashov continued, USG inquiries appeared to be prompted by governments and firms casting a broad and indiscriminate net for offers that Ukrainian companies immediately had rejected or were unable to provide. In the case of the Ukrainian company that was allegedly preparing to supply heavy water to Pakistan (ref B), for example, the Ministry of Industry had determined that the company in question had no capability to produce heavy water and, in fact, there was no heavy water in the quantity requested available for sale in all of Ukraine. The State Export Control Service also had no record of a request to negotiate or conclude such a business deal. Belashov urged us to check the validity of the intelligence information more carefully.

Action Request

¶8. (U) Request that Department provide an amended agenda to pass to MFA incorporating suggestions in paragraph 4 that are acceptable. We also request that each agenda item be annotated with a proposed Ukraine or U.S. lead, rather than ref A proposal that Ukraine and U.S. alternate on leading the discussion.

¶9. (U) Visit Embassy Kyiv's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kyiv.
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